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Introduction

NCSA logically divides its network into several different trust zones. Traffic between these zones is monitored by a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS), but traffic within a single zone may not be visible to the NIDS. Therefore, systems within a single zone must be trusted and hence hardened to a similar level.

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For the purposes of this document, production systems are defined as any system, to include allocated systems, intended to provide reliable computational and/or data services to a networked constituency. These systems include not only “customer facing” hosts, such as web servers, file servers, login nodes, etc., but also the infrastructure required to support these systems, such as backend database servers, backup and storage systems, authentication servers, etc.

NCSA

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Internal Infrastructure Board (IIB)

The leaders of ADS (Advanced Digital Services), ITS (Information Technology Services), and Security are responsible for application of this policy. These three groups are the service providers of infrastructure at NCSA and meet regularly to discuss security issues and strategy for providing better services.

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Systems requiring high availability, physical security and high performance networking are hosted here. This includes not just supercomputers, but core storage, security, networking equipment, and more. These systems are first built in a firewalled subzone until fully vetted by the security team, which is responsible for regular auditing of systems against the security requirements below.

Installation Requirements:

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Informational Requirements:

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All external links in and out of this zone are monitored by the NIDS. New hosts that appear on this network but have not been vetted may be automatically or manually blocked at the border gateway until investigated and vetted. Network traffic entirely within this zone is unmonitored by the NIDS, but network flows are collected.

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Brute-force login attempts are automatically detected and the actor is blocked from NCSA networks.

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Advanced Computational Health Enclave

Definition:

The Advanced

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While new systems are being built and configured in this zone and before they are fully vetted by security, they are firewalled in a subzone.

Host Configuration Requirements:

These systems must:

• Use secure, non-default passwords.
• Be protected by a stateful, network firewall that only accepts connections for approved, secure remote access services.

Advanced Computational Health Enclave

Definition:

The Advanced Computational Health Enclave (ACHE) is a physically and virtually segmented zone used exclusively for processing and storing sensitive data include electronic Protected Health Information (ePHI) and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI). 

Types of Systems:

ACHE is the only approved space for storing and processing ePHI and CUI, and both physical and electronic access is restricted to  covered entity workforce members with approved access. These systems often have high-availability needs, and hence this zone has a separate UPS backup system. Like the HPDC zone, these systems are first built in a firewalled subzone until fully vetted by the security team, which is responsible for the regular auditing of the systems against the additional security requirements below.

ACHE is a separately monitored zone that inherits all of the requirements of systems in the HPDC, plus additional host configuration requirements.

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Informational Requirements

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for ePHI:

• The authorized set of administrators must all be workforce members of the NCSA Health Care Component (NHCC), and this group's access must be automated by a process approved by the NCSA HIPAA Liaison.
  • The security operations team is part of this group and must be able to access systems 24/7 in an emergency.
• It is assumed that ePHI, which is high risk data, is on these systems. These are not dual-use systems but are only for work related to health and medicine. The NCSA HIPAA Liaison must be informed of any data from new sources on these systems, especially when personally identifying information is recorded.
• Approved (by the NCSA HIPAA Liaison) vulnerability and patch management procedures must be in place.
• Approved (by the NCSA HIPAA Liaison) change control procedures must be implemented and documented.
• Local and privileged account passwords are managed with the NCSA-provided, two-factor password management solution.

Informational Requirements for CUI

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• Until vetted, these machines are firewalled as described in the Installation Subzone.

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• The authorized set of administrators must all be workforce members of the NCSA Health Care Component (NHCC)Staff with ACHE Access, and this group's access must be automated by a process approved by the NCSA HIPAA LiaisonLead of Trust, Compliance and Risk Management.
  • The security operations team is part of this group and must be able to access systems 24/7 in an emergency.
• It is assumed that ePHICUI, which is high risk data, is on these systems. These are not dual-use systems but are only for work related to health and medicineresearch involving CUI. The NCSA HIPAA Liaison must Lead of Trust, Compliance and Risk Management must be informed of any data from new sources on these systems, especially when personally identifying information is recorded.
• Approved (by the NCSA HIPAA LiaisonLead for Trust, Compliance and Risk Management) vulnerability and patch management procedures must be in place.
• Approved (by the NCSA HIPAA Liaison) change the NCSA Lead for Trust, Compliance and Risk Management) change control procedures must be implemented and documented.
• Local and privileged account passwords are managed with the NCSA-provided, two-factor password management solution.

Host Configuration Requirements:

• All unnecessary services and accounts must be disabled, and enforce with host-based firewalls where possible.
• Host-based brute-force mitigations utilizing the security team's host-based IDS must be enabled if possible.
• System logs must be forwarded to the security team's log collector.
• Two-factor authentication is required for remote access. Single-sign-on is limited to 10 million seconds, the lifetime of a short-lived grid certificatecertificate.
• Brute-force mitigations will be utilized if a system's access path does not support two-factor.
• User are automatically logged-off after 12 hours of inactivity. 
• SSH sessions do not last more than 24 hours.
• Access to administrative interfaces requires two-factor bastions, jump-hosts or VPNs.
• Routing, traffic forwarding, bridging subnets and other forms of internetwork traffic proxy is prohibited without expressed permission from Security & Networking.
• ePHI is and CUI are encrypted on storage devices and only accessible to proper customer/data owner.
• Shared, writable file-systems must be securely wiped between jobs from different users or organizations.
• Data transfer endpoints must be whitelisted and scoped to the customer's networks.
• Only encrypted methods of data movement are allowed that also protect the integrity of data in transit.
• Motd and other welcome screens for users or administrators must remind them of the systems's sensitivity, the requirement for laptop encryption, that the system is only for authorized staff and clients, and the University's policies for HIPAA protected data, including HIPAA and CUI policies.

Network Monitoring:

All external links in and out of this zone are monitored by the NIDS. New hosts that appear on this network that have not been vetted and approved may be automatically or manually blocked at the border gateway until investigated and vetted. Network traffic entirely within this zone is unmonitored by the NIDS, but network flows are collected.

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While new systems are being built and configured in this zone and before they are fully vetted by security, they are firewalled in a subzone.

Host Configuration Requirements:

These systems must:

• Use secure, non-default passwords.
• Be protected by a stateful, network firewall that only accepts connections for approved, secure remote access services.

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Servers, whether supporting internal NCSA services or NCSA projects and their customers, are important, and their compromise can have a significant effect on NCSA productivity and reputation. Whether or not they are even considered production servers, the impact can be significant if the data on the systems is exposed due to privacy considerations, regulatory & legal requirements, or confidentiality agreements. Therefore, certain accountability is still required of all these systems.

Informational Requirements:

Systems or their administrators must:

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It is important that changes in the information initially provided to the security team are kept up-to-date, and system owners will need to update this annually. Changes to include high risk or confidential data need to be updated as soon as possible by contacting Security.

Host Configuration Requirements:

Systems or their administrators must:

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• System owners must follow all campus and NCSA employee policies regarding software updating, virus scanning, data security, incident reporting, etc.
• New systems must be registered with an NCSA ID to receive an IP address and if different from the NCSA ID, give a point-of-contact for Security.
  • The default network type is firewalled, though users can opt-out
  • Network registration is only for NCSA staff and should not be done for guests. Guest accounts and temporary registrations are available for these use cases.
  • Reregistration is required annually.
• Business Office systems are administered and maintained by ITS, and the corresponding workstations and laptops are on a firewalled network.

Host Configuration Requirements:

• Systems do not bridge or create new NCSA subnets (wired or wireless) without approval from Networking & Security.

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• Cryptographic and security configurations will be consistent with UIUC policies and standards of practice.
• These networks authenticate and authorize against the NCSA LDAP service, and are not used for guest access 
• Like the default office subnets, the primary wireless network is firewalled or equivalently controlled to not allow servers for outside the NCSA IP space.
• The security team must have the ability to readily map wireless IPs and timestamps to users for at least 90 days.
• Only the NCSA and/or CITES networking NCSA networking teams have the ability and authority to configure access points and networking hardware for the wireless networks NCSA buildings.

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All NPCF physical security systems, and only those systems, are part of this zone.  This includes the camera DVRs, badge readers, iris scanners, ACMS workstations (for badging, control and enrollment), and the ACMS database server.

Host Configuration Requirements:

• Devices on this network can neither connect to the other networks or be connected to except for a single ACMS workstation that must connect with iCard systems elsewhere on campus.
  • This ACMS workstation can only be connected to via RDP from a single remote workstation run by Facilities & Services for troubleshooting and support.
• All other remote connections, even if temporary for support, must be approved by the Security Office. 

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